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The general view, now widely accepted, that contemporary capitalism is characterized by 
a conflict between shareholders and management has to be drastically modified when 
applied to markets like India, where shareholdings remain concentrated in the hands of 
family business groups who control the management of ‘their’ companies. These 
controlling or ‘dominant’ shareholders do not face a problem of accountability in the 
same way that shareholders in the Anglo-American markets do because they are the 
management in the companies they control.  On the other hand, the vast majority of these 
companies are public corporations, that is, listed on the local stock exchanges, so tha t 
here the issue of governance becomes, potentially, a conflict between two categories of 
shareholders – non-controlling and controlling or minority and dominant – and is played 
out in terms that are only partially and imperfectly reflected in Cadbury. The historical 
assumption behind Cadbury was a dispersal and re-concentration of shareholdings that 
dramatically altered the balance between family business and finance capital, 
transforming the nature of British and American capitalism through most of the twentieth 
century. This trajectory (of the evolution of ‘shareholder capitalism’) has not been 
replicated elsewhere, and certainly not in India, where the sweeping changes ushered in 
by international (finance) capital since the nineties have, paradoxically, produced a re-
consolidation of family businesses. E.g., by 2004 the aggregate share of ‘promoter’ 
holdings in the listed company sector stood at roughly 55%, substantially higher than  
pre-liberalisation levels. Far from encouraging the evolution of widely held companies 
and, in this sense at least, of a more professionalised corporate sector, the ‘economic 
reforms’ era has led to a massive consolidation of equity in the hands of dominant 
shareholders and the emergence of more concentrated ownership structures.  
 
The crucial mediation here, I’d like to suggest, is regulation. In other words, 
‘liberalisation’ does not work in the abstract but as a parallelogram of forces, and 
regulation is a crucial and intrinsic part of the way individual capitals seek to manage the 
process.1 Perhaps the best illustration of this is the way India’s market regulator, the 
Securities and Exchange Board of India, has set about introducing a market for corporate 
control, that is, framing rules for the orderly conduct of takeovers. Hostile takeovers are 
rare in most countries of the world, and the only jurisdictions with active corporate 
control markets themselves embody major differences of approach to the issue. In the 
US, regulatory competition combined with weak shareholder governance has engendered 
a corporate control market hemmed in by powerful legal restrictions that strongly favour 
incumbent management and, in theory at least, make hostile bids more difficult.2 In sharp 
contrast to that situation, the UK City Code on Takeovers and Mergers set out to embody 
a self-regulatory framework for the regulation of takeovers that aimed at informality of 
procedures and flexibility in application as well as the equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, strongly discouraging or even prohibiting the use of defensive tactics.3  The 
SEBI regulations are based, ostensibly, on the City Code, yet incorporate features that 
replicate the American bias towards entrenched management. 
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The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance recognise that policies designed to 
encourage better governance of companies imply, among other principles,  that ‘Markets 
for corporate control should be allowed to function in an efficient and transparent 
manner’. From the regulatory standpoint, the general issue is: how far does SEBI’s 
takeover code meet the criteria of being an efficient and transparent mechanism for the 
conduct of hostile takeovers?  Hostile takeovers have been next to non-existent in India, 
as they have in Continental Europe and East Asia, but with liberalisation destroying the 
shibboleths that have sanctified the control of businesses by individual families and 
encouraging an increasingly furious pace of consolidation, it is widely believed that 
contested takeover bids will become less uncommon in the years to come. 
 
General criticisms of the takeover code  
 
No piece of regulation drafted by SEBI has been subjected to sharper public criticisms 
than the takeover regulations that were first issued in draft form in 1996.  The takeover 
regulations have been criticised both in general terms for skewing the balance in favour 
of incumbent management and indeed making hostile takeovers more difficult, and in 
detail, on a variety of grounds related to the wording and specific provisions of the Code. 
On the other hand, the very existence of the Code is widely perceived as a watershed in 
the history of Indian business, and powerful corporate lobbies are worried by the prospect 
of hostile takeovers.   
 
Preliminary research shows that the most controversial aspects of the takeover 
regulations concern (a) the standards of proof required to establish a presumption of 
acting in concert under the provisions of the Code; (b) the size of the mandatory public 
offer (which is currently pegged at 20%); (c) the provision allowing “promoters” to 
consolidate their holdings through ‘creeping acquisitions’ (Regulation 11); and (d) crucial 
exemptions from the purview of the Code, notably, preferential allotments and so-called 
inter-se transfers (Regulation 3 (1) ) and the enormous discretion allowed to the panel in 
granting exemptions to ‘acquirers’.  Though the committee drafting the takeover code 
borrowed the idea of ‘persons acting in concert’ from the City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers, it has been argued that ‘even in the UK, where the  code can be interpreted with 
a lot of liberty, it is found that it is very difficult to prove that parties are acting in 
concert’.4  The key point here is that the self-regulatory style of the City Code with its 
reference to the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers and the central role of the latter in 
giving ‘general guidance on the interpretation of the Code’ could scarcely have less in 
common with the deeply litigious and legalistic culture of regulation in India, where even 
the strongest circumstantial evidence may fail to satisfy the courts that parties presumed 
to be acting in concert were in fact doing so. 5  On the size of the open offer, two very 
different considerations intersected to create a certain amount of confusion.  Justice 
Bhagwati’s later explicit and publicly stated rationale for pegging the size of the open 
offer at 20% was that if acquirers were required to bid for all the shares tendered, ‘Since 
bank finance is not available to Indian companies, only the foreign companies will have 
the money to take over companies’.6 The level of the mandatory open offer was seen as 
enabling Indian companies to play an active role in the market for corporate control. The 
opposition to a public offer of this size has come from two very different quarters, 
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however. Merchant bankers have objected on the grounds that a ‘20% bid is unfair to 
minority shareholders’ in the sense that a key objective of any takeover code must be the 
provision of an exit option to all shareholders.7 By contrast, the industry associations 
representing the top echelons of Indian business lobbied for a 51% or even 100% open 
offer size precisely in order to make hostile bids less viable. Here is an issue, then, where 
regulation leaves considerable room for both ambiguity and lobbying, and the prevalence 
of pragmatic considerations over any fundamental principle has actually served to 
enhance the vulnerability of Indian promoters.  
 
The widespread perception that the takeover regulations skew the balance in favour of 
incumbent management (and, to this extent at least, make hostile takeovers more 
difficult) stems from the two remaining features mentioned above.8 The regulations still 
allow managements to consolidate at the rate of 5% in any given 12 month period.9 What 
the creeping acquisition clause does, effectively, is to allow managements to consolidate 
up to 51% without paying a control premium. In spite of this, there has been a strong 
business lobby in favour of scrapping the creeping acquisition limit altogether, possibly 
because the staggering of purchases drives up the average cost of acquisition for 
incumbent blockholders. Scrapping the limit would both sanction the idea that controlling 
shareholders are under no obligation to pay a control premium and unleash huge insider 
trading opportunities. Indeed, the (then) chairman of SEBI had to point out that such a 
step ‘might pre-empt takeover bids completely’!10   
 
Finally, the exemptions allowed under the Code have been fully exploited, so that the 
bulk of acquisition activity in the recent past has come about outside the provisions of the 
Code, that is, without the formal requirement of an open offer.  While acquisitions 
through open market purchases are restricted to a ceiling of 5% in any 12 month period, 
and outside acquirers are thus restrained in their assault on incumbent management,  there 
seems to be no limit on the controlling group increasing its stake through preferential 
allotments.11 Again, there is a view that ‘Exempting acquisition of shares through the 
preferential offer route is not fair to the non-management shareholders’.12 The bias seems 
even more evident in the exemption of inter -se transfer of shares among family members, 
group companies, etc., as if these are unlikely to have any implications for the future of 
the company.13  
 
The Code has invited criticism on various other grounds: that it is poorly drafted and 
contains major loopholes, encourages excessive litigation, allows for ambiguous or 
arbitrary interpretations, and ‘vests too much discretion in the SEBI board’. Application 
of the Code is fraught with difficulties of interpretation (such as what constitutes ‘change 
in control’, whether ‘acquirers’ in the sense defined by the code includes ‘promoters’ in 
the sense defined by the code, etc.), and these have been compounded by the practice of 
granting partial waivers and by the more recent and damaging habit of taking legal 
opinions.  All of this contrasts sharply with the functioning of the City Code in the UK, 
the proclaimed inspiration behind the SEBI regulations.14   
 
In spite of the obvious drawbacks of the Code, the evidence suggests that the open offer 




Corporate pressure on the framing and implementation of regulations 
 
What makes the Indian takeover code an extraordinary piece of formalism is that despite 
its moorings in the regulatory rhetoric of the nineties and the ostensible desire to replicate 
best practice in this field, attention to the details of regulation would show that crucial 
features of the code were designed to encourage promoters to consolidate their hold on 
companies with the eventual aim of defeating any possible bids for control. This 
conservative intent would have been much less apparent, on the surface anyway, had the 
head of the takeover panel (the committee responsible for drafting the regulation), Justice 
Bhagwati, not taken it upon himself to state publicly, on repeated occasions, that the code 
was in fact designed to shore up existing businesses against the threat of hostile takeovers 
(read: foreign companies). Far from legitimising the contestability of control, India’s 
takeover regulation has been the single most important enabling factor in the 
consolidation of promoter stakes against any possible takeover threat.    
 
The regulation was first issued in draft form in the middle of 1996 and notified in 
February 1997. 15  When the regulation was still in draft form, the committee had initially 
suggested two public offer sizes – 10% for incumbent blockholders or existing 
management, and 20% for outside acquirers, the rationale for this being that a low public 
offer size would help Indian promoters consolidate their holdings! As Bhagwati told the 
Economic Times in December 1996, ‘Banks do not assist Indian promoters in their bid to 
consolidate holdings. This is not the case with foreign companies which can raise 
overseas funds. A 20 per cent limit in this light would make it very difficult for existing 
managements to consolidate their holdings’. 16  In other words, the public offer size was 
linked to the needs of incumbent management, not potential bidders. A month later, in 
January 1997, addressing a meeting of the Indian Chamber of Commerce in Calcutta, 
Bhagwati stated that Indian companies do not have adequate defence mechanisms to cope 
with hostile takeover bids, especially when these are made by overseas players. ‘The 
former chief justice pointed out that in the absence of a facility for buyback of equity, 
Indian companies will not be in a position to thwart hostile takeovers’.17 Later the same 
month, Bhagwati defended the retention of a creeping acquisition clause against the 
Finance Ministry’s hesitations on this point and stated, ‘The new code gives an 
opportunity to existing management to consolidate its holdings. This is being done to 
protect Indian entrepreneurs from the big multinational corporations [my emphasis] as 
the former cannot match the latter in financial strength… The new code will provide a 
level playing field’.18 In 1998, when the committee was toying with the idea of raising 
the creeping acquisition limit to 5%, to accelerate consolidation of promoter holdings, 
(and of course it did so soon enough), Bhagwati argued that in India entrepreneurs have 
built up their industries over a period of time but still hold a small stake. ‘They should be 
given an opportunity to consolidate their holdings’.19   
  
Given these public declarations of intent, it is hardly surprising that the business press 
described the takeover code as a ‘blueprint for shielding Indian managements’. 20 Three 
features were particularly important to the regulator’s zealousness in encouraging 
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promoters to ringfence their companies against the possible evolution of a takeover 
market. First was the Code’s permissiveness on the issue of creeping acquisitions (that is, 
share purchases by controlling shareholders that were exempt from the obligation of a 
public offer), a clear departure from international best practice. During the first round of 
debate in 1996, investor associations had pressed for a reduction of the creeping 
acquisition limit to 1% (from the existing 2%), arguing that ‘allowing existing promoters 
to consolidate their shareholding in a company is unfair to ordinary (i.e. minority) 
shareholders’. 21 The committee, by contrast, proceeded to raise the limit by a very 
substantial margin – to 5% in October 1998, and to 10% in October 2001, retaining it at 
the 10 per cent level for two successive six-month periods, till SEBI was compelled to 
bring it back to 5% from the end of 2002 – against the wishes of the panel, which wanted 
the higher ceiling to be retained for a further 18 months.22  The background to all this was 
repeated lobbying by established business houses for a total abolition of the ceiling, an 
argument the committee was even willing to go along with,23 suggesting that controlling 
shareholders should ‘be allowed to consolidate till they reach 51 per cent, after which 
they would have to make an open offer’.24 As the business press commented, wryly, ‘To 
have a takeover code where a public offer will be mandatory only when someone wants 
to take his stake beyond 51 per cent, is to make public offers the exception rather than the 
rule’.25 
 
The second mechanism through which the takeover regulation has defied its own 
ostensible purpose of structuring a market for corporate control is the exemption of two 
major classes of control transactions from the provisions of the code, that is, preferential 
allotments and so-called ‘inter-se transfers’. Both exemptions date from the earliest 
period of the Code. Like creeping acquisitions, preferential allotments simply allowed 
controlling shareholders to shore up their stakes, that is, reinforce control, without paying 
a control premium. Moreover, unlike creeping acquisitions, there was no limit on the 
controlling group raising its stake through preferential allotments.26  These were blatantly 
unfair to minority shareholders in the sense that they openly violated the requirement that 
‘no group of shareholders should be able to acquire shares or rights which are not at the 
same time available to all other shareholders on the same terms’,27 and the fact that the 
exemption was only finally removed in late 2002, after a full six years, speaks volumes 
for the quality of regulation in India. Indeed, inter-se transfers (share transactions 
between family members or group companies) are still exempt from the takeover 
regulation. 
 
A third crucial concession concerned industry’s successful campaign to amend the 
Companies Act to allow buyback of shares. The business chambers had argued that 
‘Buyback of shares will help companies combat hostile takeover’.28 That presumed of 
course that buybacks would not be covered by the code and, sure enough, when the share 
buyback guidelines were first announced in the latter part of 1998, Justice Bhagwati 
clarified that the committee had decided ‘to amend the takeover code so that the term 
“acquirer” excludes a company making an offer for buyback’. ‘Both the buyback and the 
takeover offers would be treated as mutually exclusive and hence governed by [their] 
respective regulations’.29  In 2001 the Union Cabinet, then under BJP control, approved 
an ordinance to amend Section 77A of the Companies Act to allow buybacks of up to 
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10% of equity without shareholder approval. As the press commented, ‘The ordinance is 
designed to make it easier for promoters to secure their hold on companies, to the 
detriment of independent shareholders. It reinforces the favour the government did to 
promoters when it raised the creeping acquisition limit. Creeping acquisition permits a 
promoter to raise his share of the equity capital by buying shares in the market; buyback 
makes it possible for him to use the company’s own money to achieve the same 
objective’. 30 
 
Thus creeping acquisitions, preferential allotments and share buybacks exempt from 
takeover regulation were convergent elements of a strategy designed to encourage 
incumbent managements (that is, promoters) to reinforce control over companies in a sort 
of massive pre-emptive operation that worked on the underlying assumption that hostile 
takeovers were inevitable in the long term. What is extraordinary about this whole 
episode is that the government allowed the exercise to be conducted through a regulatory 
agency that was committed, in principle at least, to the  opposite, namely, fairness, 
transparency, and protection of minority shareholders. 
 
  
The contestability of control: capitalism at last? 
 
In all markets outside the US and UK, takeover regulations emerged as part of the 
pressure exerted by foreign institutional investors for convergence on global standards of 
accounting and corporate governance. Convergence of standards  was an essential part of 
the agenda chalked out by finance capital for the less well integrated capital markets of 
Continental Europe and Asia. But the dramatic defeat of the European Takeover 
Directive in July 2001 was a stark reminder of the huge stakes involved in an even partly 
successful implementation of that agenda. Indeed, exactly a week after the failure of the 
European Directive in the European parliament, Germany published the official draft of 
its new Takeover Act reversing the principle of board neutrality. 31  What those debates 
and their protracted divisions reflect is the underlying sense that the emergence of a 
globally integrated hostile takeover market would radically transform the nature of 
capitalism throughout Europe, loosening the grip of the large blockholders who dominate 
the corporate sector and a substantial part of the economy with their labyrinth of control 
devices and concentration of voting rights.32  Whether and how soon that happens will 
depend on the kind of corporate governance pressures and regulatory consistency that 
international investors are able to inject into domestic markets. The example of Sweden 
shows that strong pressures on the corporate governance front can lead to dramatic 
changes in the governance of family businesses – the elimination of dual-class shares, the 
disappearance of cross-holdings, even, possibly, the unravelling of those great ‘pyramids ’ 
that gird entire corporate empires. Were a strong version of the Thirteenth Directive in 
operation, these changes would be occurring even more rapidly. The Swedish example is 
less remote from India than it seems because the dilemma facing Indian business is 
remarkably similar to that confronting Swedish capital. ‘The fundamental problem for the 
Swedish model is how to attract more institutional, particularly foreign, capital while 
maintaining the closely held, family-dominated governance structure’.33 Indian 
companies have relied heavily on foreign institutional investments since the 1990s, and 
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today FIIs constitute the second largest block of investors in a wide range of these 
companies, second only to promoters.34  In spite of this, institutional investors have had 
much less of an impact on the quality of regulation in the Indian market than they have, 
evidently, in Sweden.   
 
If ‘convergence’ or the globalisation of the capital markets really were to culminate in a 
globally integrated market for corporate control, its undermining of the dense networks of 
family and large blockholder capitalism would not just replace one set of capitalists with 
another but dismantle the whole culture of clandestinity that surrounds the operation of 
business in most markets in the world today. Transparency of control is one area where 
the regulatory push for disclosure has probably yielded the least by way of actual 
transparency. That rules governing the transparency of shareholdings are pivotal to the 
proper functioning of a corporate control market has been forcefully argued in the recent 
Report of the Advisory Group on Corporate Governance set up by the Reserve Bank of 
India in 2000.  Here it is argued: ‘In the absence of correct information on the 
arrangements of the promoters for management control, the “markets for corporate 
control” do not “function in an efficient and transparent manner” in India. Currently, 
considerable debate has been going on in this area after some corporate raiders became 
active. One of the important points being debated is, whether the promoter groups should 
also be allowed to have a level playing field with the raiders by stepping up the creeping 
acquisition limit to 15%.  Much of this debate becomes opaque in the absence of any 
meaningful information on promoter shareholding in respect of the companies listed on 
the stock exchanges. If the promoters under attack resort to other ways of strengthening 
their shareholdings, it is very difficult to know whether they are abiding by the existing 
guidelines… Shareholders have a right to know about all the dealings of the promoters in 
the shares of the company in as much as they [promoters] know the holdings of others 
[acquirers] as soon as they acquire more than 5% shareholdings.’35   
 
There is a great deal of clandestinity about the true extent of promoter holdings in Indian  
companies, despite the rapid extension of the depositories. This is because lack of 
transparency is an endemic part of the way control is structured  to ‘ensure control over 
the largest possible amount of outside capital with the smallest possible amount of one’s 
own capital’.36 In India investment companies and trusts have been a crucial part of this 
“structuring” of control and have never been subject to proper regulation. For example, of 
the 46.67% generally said to be owned by the Ambanis in Reliance Industries, the 
country’s largest private sector enterprise, over 34% was controlled through at least 14 
investment companies and another 7.5% through the Petroleum Trust.37 In December last 
year it had to be specially clarified that this 7.5% stake was not part of the promoters’ 
holding, as stated (by the company, presumably) on the BSE website. 38 The promoters’ 
direct holdings were only 5.13%. To avoid this kind of confusion (opacity), SEBI has 
been debating the issue of a more reliable format for disclosure of promoter 
shareholdings. ‘Among other things, the new format replaces the term “promoter 
holdings” with “holdings of the controlling group”. This will, at one stroke, bring into the 
open the total stake that is, in effect, under the control of the promoter group, and will 
impact promoters who control companies through nominal shareholdings in their own 
name but significant stakes through trusts and other legal entities’.39 Indeed, the essential 
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purpose of the investment companies is to ‘mask the way a company is controlled by a 
promoter’.40 
 
The Indian family-controlled business houses have been under pressure to clean up their 
balance sheets and rationalize their businesses, including the crossholdings that have 
traditionally acted as their takeover defence, and there has been a great deal of 
restructuring in the past decade. But the sheer ability of the system to survive through a 
period that has seen a substantial increase in levels of competition is due less to any 
intrinsic strengths or capabilities it may have than to the role played by regulation in 
structuring the rules of competition. Indeed, regulation itself can be a means of speeding 
up the rationalization of family capital. E.g. , the term “promoter” has now been expanded 
to include all persons or entities in control of a firm, directly or indirectly, including 
spouses, parents, brothers, sisters, children, etc . ‘Thus entities that come under the new 
definition of promoters can avail themselves of the benefit of not having to make an open 
offer when making inter -se transfers of shares’.41 This is a good example of the nuances 
of regulative practice and the way they can be used to speed up consolidation within 
family businesses, that is, actively shape the nature of business. Other definitions have 
been notoriously less easy to apply, for example, what constitutes a “change in control”?  
When Gujarat Ambuja acquired an 11%+ block in rival cement maker ACC in two 
separate transactions with the Tatas and also got two seats on the board (Sekhsaria, the 
Ambuja promoter, taking over as vice-chairman of ACC), SEBI decided this was not a 
‘change in control’ and therefore did not warrant an open offer to other shareholders of 
ACC. But it was through Sekhsaria’s stake in ACC that Holcim entered the Indian 
cement market in 2005, with plans to invest close to $2bn in the company! If the ACC 
acquisition goes through, it will make Holcim the world’s largest cement manufacturer, 
ahead of Lafarge.42 Acquisitions have played a pivotal role in the consolidation and 
globalisation of the Indian cement industry, showing that the forces at work in the 
expansion of international business can never be completely forestalled by domestic 
regulatory practice.      
 
 
To sum up, the evolution of the takeover code illustrates a fascinating feature of the 
regulatory process in India, namely, the conflicting pressures under which much of the 
new financial market regulation has evolved and the immense leeway given to 
established promoter groups to shape the regulatory agenda to their own advantage. That 
the takeover committee has lived (or had to live) with a great deal of corporate pressure is 
suggested both by the statements of individual members and by the extraordina ry 
displays of corporate solidarity that greeted the raids launched by the jute baron Arun 
Bajoria late in 2000. It is even more extraordinary that the chairman of the panel seemed 
to think there was no conflict of interest involved in making repeated public declarations 
to the effect that the Code was designed to ‘protect Indian entrepreneurs from the big 
multinational corporations ’43 and that Indian entrepreneurs ‘should be given an 
opportunity to consolidate their holdings’.44 The obvious question this raises about the 
nature of the regulatory process in India is whether any regulatory system can credibly be 
designed to serve partisan interests and whether takeover regulations designed in this way 
can meet the criteria we began with. A more interesting issue is why institutional 
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